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Abstract 
Voter turnout is not just dependent on individual characteristics of voters, but also on evaluations 
of the party system. It has been argued that both indifference and alienation can have a negative 
impact on the tendency to vote. While indifference means that the voter perceives little or no 
differences between the options that are available within the party system, alienation means that 
the voter has a negative evaluation of all political parties. In this paper we suggest that it is 
essential to take multiple parties into account when operationalizing indifference in a multiparty 
setting. The analysis shows that measures that move beyond looking at the top two parties are 
indeed superior in predicting voter turnout in multiparty systems, compared to cruder 
measurements. An analysis of CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) data shows that 
alienation has a stronger impact on voter turnout than indifference. We conclude with some 
observation on how a negative evaluation of the party system can contribute to a trend of 
declining voter turnout. 
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1. Introduction 
The decline of turnout levels worldwide and the implications of this decline for the functioning of 
democracy have stimulated scholars to investigate the factors causing citizens to abstain from 
voting. A rich literature indicates that socio-demographic and psychological factors such as age, 
education, political interest or a sense of civic duty are significantly related to voter turnout 
(Blais, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004; Blais, 2000; Franklin, 2004; Leighley & Nagler, 2012; 
Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Furthermore, it is by now well established that the political 
context is of crucial importance to understand whether or not citizens turn out to vote. Citizens do 
not act in a vacuum, the choice between turning out to vote or abstaining is also determined by 
the parties at offer, the closeness of the elections or salient campaign issues (Adams, Dow, & 
Merrill, 2006; Brody & Page, 1973; Plane & Gershtenson, 2004; Zipp, 1985). 
The literature focusing on how the choice set of political parties affects citizens’ likelihood to 
turn out to vote, is based on a distinction between indifference and alienation. First, indifference 
implies that citizens do not have a clear preference for a specific party, in contrast to other 
parties. Alienation, on the other hand, refers to a negative evaluation of all political parties 
competing in the election (Brody & Page, 1973). Previous research on the impact of these 
evaluations on turnout does indicate that both indifference and alienation significantly affect the 
probability that a voter will turn out to vote on Election Day. Most of these studies, however, 
were conducted in the context of the United States. This focus on one specific electoral context 
also implies a one-sided way of conceptualizing and investigating how indifference and 
alienation affect turnout. Especially with regard to attitudes that reflect how voters perceive the 
party system it is essential to take into account contextual-level variation. 
The decline in turnout levels and the challenges this poses to democracy are obviously not 
limited to the United States, as the decline of turnout levels is also observed in numerous other 
political systems (Franklin, 2004; Hooghe, 2014). For this reason, it is essential to investigate the 
dynamics of indifference and alienation in a wider set of democracies. Implementing these 
concepts in a variety of political settings where the number of parties varies strongly, we take into 
account multiple parties in our operationalization of indifference and alienation. 
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This paper proceeds as follows. We start by reviewing the literature on the relation between 
preferences and turnout, with a special focus on indifference and alienation. Next, we address 
how scholars have previously measured preferences and what the shortcomings of these 
approaches are for a comparative analysis. We then present our approach and methodology and 
introduce the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which provides the data to test 
our hypotheses. After presenting the results from our analyses we end with some concluding 
remarks on our findings and implications for further research. 
 
2. Indifference and alienation 
Previous research has shown that in order to understand why some citizens turn out to vote and 
others abstain, the political context is important. A number of scholars claim that the choice set of 
candidates or parties available to voters strongly affects whether they will turn out to vote. Both 
feelings of indifference and feelings of alienation have been argued to significantly affect 
electoral participation. 
Indifference refers to a perception of little or no significant differences between parties. As a 
consequence, which party wins does not matter for a voter and the benefit of voting for any of 
those parties is equal. From a rational voting perspective, then, these equal benefits should lead a 
citizen to abstain from voting (Downs, 1957). The authors of the American Voter expect that a 
voter “fails to vote because he does not have a clear preference between partisan objects” 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960: 97). On these grounds, it can be expected that if a 
citizen does not have a clear preference for a specific party, s/he is less likely to go out and vote. 
Alienation, on the other hand, concerns the level at which citizens evaluate candidates or parties. 
As Brody and Page (1973) have pointed out, alienation captures the extent to which a citizen 
feels negative about the entire choice set. The link with turnout is straightforward, if a voter 
thinks none of the parties or candidates at offer is sufficiently attractive, this voter will not turn 
out to vote (Callander & Wilson, 2007). 
Besides theoretical accounts on how indifference and alienation fit within a rational choice 
framework, there are also a number of empirical studies investigating the impact of indifference 
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and alienation on turnout. Brody and Page (1973) and Zipp (1985) have convincingly shown that 
in the context of US presidential elections, both indifference and alienation decrease the 
likelihood that citizens turn out to vote. There seems to be a renewed interest among political 
scientists in how indifference and alienation affect turnout, as is clear from a number of recent 
publications. The geographical focus of these studies is still mostly confined to the United States 
(Adams et al., 2006; Callander & Wilson, 2007; Leighley & Nagler, 2012; Plane & Gershtenson, 
2004; Yoo, 2010). These studies, focusing either on both indifference and alienation or on one of 
the concepts only, unequivocally indicate that indifference and alienation decrease the probability 
that a citizen turns out to vote. 
A number of scholars have implemented the concepts of indifference and alienation in other 
electoral contexts as well. Johnston, Matthews and Bittner (2007), for example, find a relation 
between indifference and alienation, and turnout in Canada. Indeed, they find that “ [a]n increase 
in either produces a decrease in turnout, with the largest effect of the two emanating from 
alienation.” (Johnston et al., 2007 : 740). Aarts and Wessels (2005) find similar results for a set 
of European countries. Focusing on operationalizations of indifference only, Melton (2013) 
furthermore makes use of CSES-data to investigate the validity of three different indifference 
measures. 
The first theoretical accounts and empirical analyses of indifference and alienation originate in 
the context of the United States. Consequently, theoretical accounts and empirical 
operationalizations are largely influenced by the U.S. political system (e.g., the focus on 
candidates, on a one-dimensional ideological space or on the bipartisan system). Substantively, 
however, choice options available to voters should affect turnout in any democracy. In no single 
setting do citizens “make political decisions in a vacuum” (Aarts & Wessels, 2005: 74). The few 
studies that have investigated indifference and alienation in other than the U.S. context do indeed 
provide evidence for the travelling capacity of both concepts and their effects on vote. For this 
reason, we hypothesize that for the set of democracies covered by the CSES-project as well both 
indifference and alienation will decrease the likelihood that a citizen turns out to vote. 
H1: The more indifferent a voter is toward political parties, the less likely s/he is to turn out to 
vote. 
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H2: The more alienated a voter is from the party system, the less likely s/he is to turn out to vote. 
 
3. A comparative perspective on indifference and alienation 
A number of scholars have investigated indifference and alienation from a spatial modeling 
perspective. For operationalizing both concepts, these authors look at the ideological position of a 
voter within a party space. An alienated voter is then a voter who is ideologically close to none of 
the parties, while an indifferent voter is positioned at an equal distance of multiple parties 
(Adams et al., 2006; Plane & Gershtenson, 2004; Thurner & Eymann, 2000; Zipp, 1985). 
Unfortunately, such an approach is not suited for a cross-national analysis of indifference and 
alienation. While some electoral arenas are characterized by one dominant ideological dimension, 
previous research has indicated that multiple dimensions are at play in other settings (Bertoa, 
2014). Furthermore, some authors claim that new dimensions are arising and affecting the 
behavior of voters and parties (Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006). This variety of ideological 
constellations across countries and their dynamical nature, therefore, make it impossible to 
develop a valid cross-national spatial analysis of indifference and alienation within these 
conditions. 
An alternative approach that has occasionally been used to investigate indifference and alienation 
looks at party evaluations. Alienated voters are voters who evaluate none of the parties positively, 
while indifferent voters evaluate multiple parties equally (Aarts & Wessels, 2005; Brody & Page, 
1973; Johnston et al., 2007). Such an approach to operationalize indifference and alienation has a 
higher travelling capacity and can easily be applied in different electoral contexts. These 
measures come with the additional advantage of not limiting voters’ preferences of parties to 
ideological considerations. Research has shown that vote choices and party preferences are 
determined not only by ideology but also by the socio-structural characteristics of voters, 
economic perceptions or attitudes towards candidates (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 2009; Miller 
& Shanks, 1996). As a consequence, party evaluations could be considered a broad summary 
measure of different factors, including ideological attitudes as well. 
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A number of studies have already investigated indifference comparatively by looking at measures 
of party preference (Aarts & Wessels, 2005; Melton, 2013). A question that has not been 
addressed yet, however, is how indifference should be looked at if there is variation in the 
number of parties at offer. Brody and Page (1973: 4) defined indifference as “the maximum 
amount of difference between the evaluation of any two candidates”, implying that only the most 
and the least preferred candidate are taken into account. This is also the operationalization used 
by Johnston et al. (2007) in their analysis of indifference in Canada. Aarts and Wessels (2005) 
take a different approach and define a voter as indifferent when she gives her highest party rating 
to more than one party. Doing so, they in essence only take into consideration the party 
evaluations of the two most preferred parties. If the two top scores are equal, a voter is 
indifferent, if not, then a voter is not indifferent. Kroh, van der Brug and van der Eijk (2007) as 
well only take into account the two most preferred parties when calculating indifference. They 
simply calculate the difference between the ratings for the most and the second most preferred 
party. With multiple parties at offer, however, both approaches can mask important differences in 
how citizens evaluate the parties.  
In Figure 1 we illustrate how the operationalization of Brody and Page (1973), that looks at the 
most and least preferred party only, can be misleading. We do so by graphically presenting the 
party preferences of two hypothetical voters. Ann likes Party 1 most and gives that party the 
maximum rating of 10. To the other four parties, she gives a rating of 1, which results in an 
indifference score of 10-1=9. Ben also gives the maximum rating of 10 to his most preferred 
party and he as well has a minimum rating of 1. As a consequence, the indifference-score for Ben 
–using the Brody and Page operationalization– is equal to Ann’s indifference score. Ann 
evaluates parties 2 to 4 much more negative than Ben does, however, and comparing both voters 
it does seem logical to consider Ben a more indifferent voter than Ann. This difference between 
both voters is not taken into account in the Brody and Page indifference measure.  
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Figure 1. Party preferences for hypothetical voters – example 1 
 
By means of a second example (see Figure 2), we illustrate that only taking into account the top-
two party ratings to construct a measure of indifference implies a loss of information as well. 
Using the approach of Aarts and Wessels (2005), both Carol and David would be defined as 
indifferent because both give their maximum rating to two parties. The Kroh et al. (2007) 
approach as well would lead to evaluating Carol and David as equally indifferent, because for 
both voters the difference between the most and the second most preferred party is 0. Looking at 
how Carol and David evaluate the other parties, however, it is clear that David is more indifferent 
than Carol is. While David rates all five parties about equally, Carol has a clear preference for 
two parties over the other options available 
Figure 2. Party preferences for hypothetical voters – example 2 
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The examples illustrate that operationalizing indifference by looking at two parties only –either 
being the most and the second most preferred or the most and the least preferred party– implies a 
substantial loss of information. Both approaches can mask important differences in degrees of 
indifference when a voter has more than two parties to evaluate. For this reason, in this paper we 
hypothesize that a more fruitful approach when investigating indifference in a variety of political 
systems –with quite often more than two parties at offer– is to take into account differences in 
voters’ evaluations of all parties. In this study, we will therefore use both the traditional measures 
of indifference, and a more encompassing measure that includes information on all political 
parties at offer. 
 
4. Control variables 
Self-evidently, we cannot assess how indifference and alienation affect voter turnout without 
taking into account other variables that scholars have repeatedly found to determine whether or 
not a citizen abstains from voting. First, there is a set of psychological explanations of why one 
votes. A person who is interested in politics is more likely to vote (Blais, 2000; Dalton, 2007). 
When one is disposed to politics, or interested, political knowledge is also usually higher. This is 
why knowledge as well has been found to increase the probability that a citizen turns out to vote 
(Larcinese, 2007).  
Second, socio-demographic variables also have their effects. Education is strongly correlated 
with turnout, but the strength of the relation varies cross-nationally (Gallego, 2010). Age is a 
widely known strong predictor for voting (Blais, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004; Wolfinger & 
Rosenstone, 1980). The more a citizen is old, the more a citizen is likely to vote. The relation is 
not linear, however, because turnout tends to decrease during the last years of life mainly due to 
physical restrictions (Blais, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004). Recent studies have also suggested that 
the relation would look like a roller-coaster (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012) because 1
st
-time voters 
would vote in a greater proportion than 2
nd
- and 3
rd
-time voters. Brady, Verba and Schlozman 
(1995) have shown that civic skills are required to participate in the public sphere and these are 
also developed in places of religious worship. Indeed, religious attendance is positively correlated 
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with turnout and political participation (Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte, & Nadeau, 2004; Cassel, 1999; 
Fowler & Dawes, 2008).  
Third, investigating the impact of indifference and alienation comparatively means that we must 
take into account some institutional variables that are regularly linked to turnout. The electoral 
system influences citizens’ decision to cast a ballot, either positively or negatively. Systems with 
proportionality rules (PR) are known to have a higher turnout (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998), but it 
does not come without consequences. Proportionality rules also are associated with the presence 
of a greater number of parties than in non-PR systems. “Because they are offered more choice, 
fewer citizens should feel indifferent or alienated from the party system” (Blais & Aarts, 2006 : 
183). Yet, as recognized early by Jackman (1987), more parties can also create uncertainty 
toward the election result because of the coalition formation. Electoral systems organize how 
votes are translated into seats and may create distortions. The relation between disproportionality 
and turnout itself is not straightforward either. As reported by Blais and Aarts (2006), cross-
national studies report a strong negative impact on turnout while others find no significant effect. 
The largest sample of elections studied (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998) provides indications of a 
small significant effect for disproportionality. Finally, compulsory voting has been one of the 
most consistent predictors for turnout, even when it is not strictly enforced (Geys, 2006; 
Quintelier, Hooghe & Marien, 2011).  
 
5. Data and Method 
5.1. Data 
To assess the transportability of indifference and alienation in terms of measures as well as 
concepts, a cross-national sample is needed. For this study, we thus use the third module of the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. For the estimations, we included only countries for 
which the Freedom House ratings indicate that the countries could be considered free (below 3) 
during the year the election was held. We have thus excluded Belarus, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. Furthermore, the data from the USA have also been excluded 
because there was no variation on the dependent variable after the exclusion of discrete 
respondents. This leaves us with 29 countries totalizing 29,373 respondents. 
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5.2. Dependent variable: turnout 
We perform a cross-national analysis of turnout employing individual-level survey data. Doing 
so, we have to be aware of the fact that due to a social desirability bias, turnout is generally 
overreported in post-electoral surveys. Validation studies have furthermore shown that biases are 
not randomly distributed, but that some citizens are more likely to overreport participation than 
others (Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2012; Karp & Brockington, 2005). Additionally, the extent to 
which turnout is overreported varies systematically across countries and elections as well, with 
especially voters in high turnout settings being vulnerable to over reporting (Karp & 
Brockington, 2005; Selb & Munzert, 2013).
1
 As clear from Table 1, the average reported turnout 
in our sample is 82%, which notably includes countries with compulsory voting (Australia 2007 
and Greece 2009). Participation varies from 95% in Australia in 2007 to 52% in Poland in 2005.  
Table 1. Reported turnout by elections (from the lowest to the highest) 
Elections Turnout (%) Elections Turnout (%) 
Poland 2005 52.28 Austria 2008 85.95 
South Korea 2008 64.72 Mexico 2006 86.48 
Switzerland 2007 68.52 Ireland 2007 88.50 
Poland 2007 71.03 Greece 2009 88.52 
Czech Republic 2010 71.21 France 2007 89.85 
Czech Republic 2006 73.90 Sweden 2006 90.37 
Portugal 2009 76.06 Netherlands 2010 91.31 
Mexico 2009 77.11 Iceland 2007 91.47 
Slovakia 2010 78.18 Romania 2009 91.64 
Germany 2009 79.39 Iceland 2009 92.48 
Latvia 2010 79.50 Netherlands 2006 93.09 
Israel 2006 80.89 New Zealand 2008 93.30 
South Africa 2008 81.08 Germany 2005 93.61 
Croatia 2007 81.51 Australia 2007 94.18 
Japan 2007 85.14 Mean 82.46 
 
5.3. Measures of alienation and indifference 
As stated before, we operationalize alienation and indifference by means of party evaluation 
scores. We focus on alienation first. Brody and Page (1973: 4) stated “If a respondent feels 
                                                          
1
.Multilevel modeling does not allow us yet to properly weight our dependent variable because of the required 
scaling on each level (Chantala, Blanchette, & Suchindran, 2011) when using a binary dependent variable (e.g., use 
of logistic regression). 
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highly negative about even his most favored candidate – that is, if there is no candidate whom he 
particularly likes – it is reasonable to call him ‘alienated’”. Staying close to this 
conceptualization, a good measure of alienation is a respondent’s maximum party evaluation. The 
lower that value is, the more alienated we can consider a voter to be. In order to have an indicator 
in which higher values reflect more alienation, we therefore subtract the maximum party 
evaluation a respondent gives from the maximum value that can be reported. 
A = Max - Pmax  
Where A is the measure of alienation, Max is the maximum value that can be reported and Pmax is the 
highest evaluation score a respondent gives to any of the parties 
Second, we employ a number of different operationalizations of indifference. We have 
hypothesized that in multiparty contexts it is more fruitful to take all parties into account than to 
only focus on the two top-ranked or the most and the least preferred parties only. In order to test 
this hypothesis, we make use of three different measures of indifference. In a first measure, we 
take the difference of the evaluation for the most and the least preferred party and subtract this 
from the maximum value that can be reported. As such, higher values indicate more indifference. 
 Imax-min = Max - (Pmax – Pmin) 
Where Imax-min is the measure of indifference, Max is the maximum value that can be reported, Pmax is the 
highest evaluation score a respondent gives to any of the parties and Pmin is the lowest evaluation score a 
respondent gives to any of the parties.  
A second measure is based on the difference of the evaluation of the first and second most 
preferred party.  
 I1st-2nd = Max-(P1st – P2nd) 
Where I1st-2nd is the measure of indifference, Max is the maximum value that can be reported, P1st is 
the highest evaluation score a respondent gives to any of the parties and P2nd is the 2
nd
 highest evaluation 
score a respondent gives to any of the parties. 
A third measure, finally, is based on the mean difference between the maximum evaluation and 
how any other party is evaluated.  
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 Imean =Max- ( 
 
   
 ∑         
 
    ) 
Where Imean is the measure of indifference, Max is the maximum value that can be reported, Pmax is 
the highest evaluation score a respondent gives to any of the parties and Pi is any other party evaluation 
score. 
To clarify the construction of the three indifference measures, look at the preferences of Ann and 
Ben in Figure 1 and of Carol and David in Figure 2 as presented in Table 1. The metric implies 
that higher values indicate more indifference. Additionally, before including the measures in our 
analyses, the indicators of indifference and alienation were standardized to run from 0 to 1. Doing 
so, we assure comparability of different measures. 
Table 2. Comparing measures of indifference for hypothetical voters 
 Imax-min I1st-2nd Imean 
Ann 10-(10-1) = 1 10-(10-1) = 1 10-((9+9+9+9)/4) = 1 
Ben 10-(10-1) = 1 10-(10-8) = 8 10-((2+2+2+9)/4) = 6.25 
Carol 10-(9-2) = 3 10-(9-9) = 10 10-((0+7+7+7)/4) = 4.75 
David 10-(9-8) = 9 10-(9-9) = 10 10-((0+1+1+1)/4)=9.25 
 
Building on the literature on turnout, we control for a large set of independent variables that have 
regularly been found to affect citizens’ probability to turn out to vote. Age is included as a 
continuous variable. Furthermore, we add age-squared in order to assess the curvilinear relation 
found in previous studies. Gender is also controlled for as an antecedent variable and female 
respondents are coded 1. Education has four categories: no or only a primary education, 
secondary education, college education and university education and higher. The CSES-surveys 
included three political knowledge questions adapted to each country. The variable is coded from 
0 (no right answers) to 3 (all answers right). Additionally, we control for country-level variables 
as well. We follow the suggestion from Blais and Aarts (2006) to not include dummies for party 
systems, but rather to include measures for the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) and 
disproportionality from the previous election. “Disproportionality can be conceptualized as a 
summary measure that takes into account both the electoral formula and district magnitude” 
(Blais & Aarts, 2006 : 188). Taking these rates at time t would be faulty because voters resent the 
effects of these two measures only after the elections result are out, which is, as we know all, 
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after they decided to cast a ballot. These two indices have been retrieved from Michael 
Gallagher’s Election Indices Dataset. A dummy variable for compulsory voting is also added. 
Descriptive for all independent variables are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Descriptive independent variables 
Variables Min Max Mean Standard 
deviation 
N 
Indifference (Max-Min) 0 1 0.363 0.275 29,373 
Indifference (1st-2nd) 0 1 0.814 0.200 29,373 
Indifference (Mean) 0 1 0.564 0.216 29,373 
Alienation 0 1 0.218 0.202 29,373 
Age 16 106 47.349 17.308 29,373 
Age-squared 256 11236 2541.426 1718.828 29,373 
Gender 0 1 0.526 0.499 29,373 
Education 1 4 2.388 0.989 29,373 
Religious attendance 0 1 0.429 0.367 29,373 
Political knowledge 0 3 1.616 1.001 29,373 
Effective number of 
electoral parties 
1.97 10.62 4.853 1.663 29 
Disproportionality 0.26 21.95 5.332 4.296 29 
Compulsory voting 0 1 0.152 0.359 29 
 
5.4. Method 
The CSES-data have a nested structure, with individual respondents nested in countries. This 
structure makes it possible to approach the data in a hierarchical multilevel way. Moreover, this 
allows to not only look at the individual level indicators of turnout, but also at how differences in 
the electoral context affect whether or not a respondent turns out to vote. The appropriate analysis 
method is therefore multilevel regression analysis (Gelman & Hill, 2007). The binary nature of 
the dependent variable furthermore necessitates the use of logistic regression analysis, which is 
why we present the results of multilevel logistic regressions. 
Besides assessing the impact of indifference and alienation on the pooled data, however, we also 
present the results of country-by-country regressions. These election-specific regressions allow us 
to assess whether the explanatory power of different measures of indifference varies as the 
number of parties in an electoral context increases. 
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6. Results 
Theoretically, we know that indifference and alienation are different concepts, but are they also 
independent once they have been operationalized? As a first step, we tested to what extent each 
of the indicators of indifference correlates with alienation. Correlations between each of the three 
indifference measures and alienation are positive. As indifference increases, alienation increases 
as well. The correlation coefficient for the Imax-min measure is 0.724, it is 0.394 for the I1st-2nd 
measure and 0.704 for the comprehensive measure. All three correlations are significant at the 
0.001 level. The strength of the correlation for the I1st-2nd measure is moderate, while the two 
others are strong correlations. Given these high correlations, we verified collinearity with the 
tolerance tests for each indifference measures and alienation in the regression analyses. VIF 
statistics vary from 1.19 to 2.16 and were therefore all within acceptable limits. We can thus be 
confident of the independence of our measures of indifference on the one hand and alienation on 
the other. It still has to be noted, however, that voters who do not have a strong preference for 
one specific party, are also more likely to be alienated from the entire political system. 
As a first step, we investigate whether – as we hypothesized – alienation and indifference are 
indeed significantly decreasing the probability that a citizen will turn out to vote. We do so by 
means of multilevel regression models in which we control for individual-level and for country-
level factors. We estimate three different models with each time another measure of indifference 
included. For reasons of space, we only present the full models here, but as clear from the tables 
in appendix, there are no substantial differences for the effects of indifference and alienation in 
the more parsimonious models.  
Estimating a null-model indicates an intraclass correlation coefficient of 0.182. With 18% of the 
variation between elections, taking into account contextual differences is therefore quite 
important. Table 4 reports the results for the full models with each of the three measures of 
indifference.  
First, we look at the effects of the three measures of indifference. As is clear from the results in 
Table 4, both the Imax-min as well as the Imean measure are significantly related to turnout. The 
effects are in expected directions and indicate that the more indifferent a citizen is, the less likely 
s/he is to turn out to vote. Unlike what holds for these two measures of indifference, the measure 
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based on the difference between the most and the second most liked party is not significantly 
related to turnout. As the other measures are significantly related to turnout, it seems that this 
measure is not well-suited to capture citizens’ feelings of indifference towards the parties at offer. 
The non-significant relationship would suggest that the validity of this indifference measure is to 
be questioned. Melton (2013: 15) had also previously suggested that this measure lacks of face 
validity and has weak criterion validity, which could explain why the effect is not strong and not 
significant. This represents also an argument advocating for the use of evaluations of all parties in 
the system instead of two. Despite the fact that this measure is not found to have a significant 
impact on the probability that a citizen turns out to vote, the fact that the other two measures 
indicate strong and significant effects provides suggestive evidence for our first hypothesis. This 
also suggests that results from a two-party system cannot just be used to evaluate multiparty 
systems. While in a two-party system the distance between the first and the second (and therefore 
also the last) party is obviously very important, this measurement is not necessarily relevant in a 
multi-party systems where a multitude of political parties are at offer. 
The results furthermore indicate a strong and significant impact of alienation on turnout. Higher 
levels of alienation from the party system are associated with a significantly lower probability to 
turn out to vote. Additionally and quite importantly, since we standardized the measures 
indifference and alienation to all run from 0 to 1 we can directly compare their impact from 
looking at the coefficients. Doing so indicates that alienation has a more profound impact on the 
probability that a citizen turns out to vote than indifference has. The results in Table 4 lead us to 
safely conclude that we can accept our second hypothesis; a higher level of alienation indeed 
significantly decreases the probability that one will turn out to vote. Furthermore, and in line with 
previous research, we can conclude that the effect of alienation is stronger than the effect of 
indifference. 
Looking at the individual-level control variables, then, we can observe that a respondent’s gender 
does not significantly affect the probability to turn out. Age, age squared, educational levels, 
religious attendance and political knowledge are all significant and their direction is in line with 
what the literature suggests. Somewhat surprisingly, and even though the null-model indicated 
that 18% of the variance is to be found at the election-level, none of the contextual-level 
indicators seems to be significantly related to turnout. The differences we find between elections 
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thus obviously have other determinants, like e.g., the closeness of the elections, or the election 
campaign. 
Table 4. Multilevel regression with reported turnout as dependent variable 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 Max-Min 1
st
-2
nd
 Curtosis 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Intercept -0.061 -0.699 -0.042 
 (0.634) (0.642) (0.642) 
Independent variables    
Indifference  -0.704*** -0.055 -0.428** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.123) 
Alienation -2.132*** -2.795*** -2.510*** 
 (0.134) (0.093) (0.120) 
Individual-level controls    
Age -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age
2 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.076 -0.078 -0.077 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
Education 0.257*** 0.262*** 0.262*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Religious attendance 0.614*** 0.606*** 0.612*** 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
Political knowledge 0.333*** 0.341*** 0.339*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Country-years-level 
controls 
   
Effective Number Parties -0.069 -0.063 -0.062 
 (0.127) 0.128 (0.128) 
Disproportionality -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Compulsory voting 0.795 0.773 0.784 
 (0.647) (0.651) (0.654) 
ICC 0.173 0.175 0.176 
Log likelihood -10,363.319 -10,383.742 -10,377.812 
Source : CSES - Module 3. 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.  *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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The results of the multilevel analyses on the pooled data indicate that both indifference and 
alienation decrease the likelihood that one turns out to vote. Additionally, it is clear that 
alienation has a much stronger effect than indifference has. As a second step, we aim to shed light 
on the question whether measures of indifference that take all parties into account are better 
predictors of turnout as there are more parties in a system. To this end, we look at bivariate 
relationships between each of the measures of indifference and turnout. Countries are sorted by 
the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). We show the marginal effects of bivariate 
logistic regressions and the 95% confidence interval. Marginal effects are easier to interpret than 
coefficients and inform us on the significance of the relationship. In Figure 3, we see the effects 
of the Imax-min measure. All effects are negative and significant at the 0.001 level. Turnout in many 
Eastern European countries is more affected by indifference than in other countries decreasing 
the probability the vote without about 60 percentage points. On the opposite side, turnout in 
France, Australia and Ireland is less affected by indifference because the probability to vote 
decreases of only 10 percentage points. It is interesting to see that indifference still has a 
significant effect on turnout even in Australia and in Greece in 2009 where voting is compulsory, 
but not strictly enforced.  
Figure 3 – Effects of indifference (Imax-min) on turnout 
 
In Figure 4, we see the effects on turnout of the I1st-2nd indifference measure. Generally, the 
effects are less strong if we compare with the other indifference measures, but many relationships 
are not significant. Effects at the 0.001 significance level are only found in 8 elections: Greece, 
Japan, Korea, Austria, Czech Republic (2010), Poland (2005 and 2007), Slovakia and Mexico 
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(2009). These are also the elections where the effects are the strongest in this figure, but not as 
strong as in the other figures. We can thus only rely on the effects found in these countries. 
However, the Czech elections are again the most affected by indifference because it decreases the 
probability to vote with 70 percentage points, while the other significant elections’ effects vary 
between 40 and 30 percentage points. The few significant relationships further confirm what the 
multilevel analyses already pointed out; the I1st-2nd measure of indifference does not seem to 
capture indifference well. The marginal effects presented in Figure 4 indicate that this holds for 
almost every election in the sample. Regardless of contextual differences, therefore, it seems as if 
this measure is not a valid indicator of the concept of indifference. 
Figure 4. Effects of indifference(I1st-2nd) on turnout 
 
In Figure 5, we present the effects of the Imean indifference measure. Effects on turnout are all 
negative and significant at the 0.001 level except for Mexico in 2006. The two Czech elections 
are once again where indifference has the strongest effect on turnout. Compared to Figure 3, the 
effect is even stronger, decreasing the probability to vote with almost 80 percentage points. 
Again, we find many East-European countries where turnout is strongly affected by indifference, 
along with South Korea and Japan.  
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Figure 5. Effects of indifference(Imean) on turnout 
 
The election-by-election analyses presented above indicate that there is substantial variation 
between countries in the extent to which indifference affects the probability of turnout. We have 
hypothesized that as the number of parties in a system increases, a measure of indifference taking 
into account multiple parties would better predict turnout. Even though elections are sorted by the 
number of parties in Figures 3 to 5, it is impossible to see a clear trend in explanatory power as 
the number of parties increases. To test this hypothesis, we look at two indicators of goodness of 
fit and the extent to which these are related to the number of parties in a system; the Cragg-Uhler 
Nagelkerke R
2
 and the percentage of correct predictions. 
According to our hypothesis, we expect to find a positive correlation between the number of 
parties in a system and the pseudo-R
2
 and a positive correlation between the number of parties 
and the number of correct predictions. Additionally, our hypothesis specifies that we expect this 
to hold for measures of indifference taking into account all parties at offer. Translating this to our 
three measures of indifference, we do not expect to find a significant correlation for the I1st-2nd 
measure, as this measure only takes into account the two most preferred parties. We could expect 
to find a significant correlation for the Imax-min measure, since by its focus on the extremes, this 
measure does indirectly take all parties into account. The strongest correlation is expected for the 
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Imean measure of indifference, because this index explicitly takes all variation in party evaluations 
into account. 
Table 5 presents the results of these tests and shows that none of the correlations are significant. 
We hence cannot interpret the correlation coefficients. As a consequence, we are unable to 
confirm our third hypothesis. The effective number of electoral parties is not related to how much 
change in turnout we can explain with indifference, nor it is related with the percentage of correct 
predictions made by using indifference as a predictor of turnout. We did predict correctly that I1st-
2nd would not give us significant relations. However, because no correlations are significant, Imax-
min and Imean are most probably equally good measures in predicting turnout.  
Table 5. Correlations between ENEP and R
2
 and ENEP and the percentage of correct 
predictions 
 Correlation ENEP-pseudo-R
2 
Correlation ENEP-% correct 
predictions 
Imax-min -0.033 
(0.864) 
-0.180 
(0.350) 
I1st-2nd -0.056 
(0.774) 
-0.140 
(0.470) 
Imean -0.058 
(0.766) 
-0.157 
(0.417) 
Source : CSES - Module 3 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses below the correlation coefficients. 
 
The main interesting finding is that the effects of both indifference measures taking all parties 
into account, directly or indirectly, are not influenced by the number of parties in the system. If 
we refer to Table 4 a last time, we see that the coefficient for Imax-min is of -0.704 while it takes 
only two party evaluations into account so this measure probably overestimates the effect of 
indifference. The coefficient for Imean, which is taking all parties into account, is -0.428, meaning 
that less variation is lost in the calculations of indifference. The true effect of indifference on 
turnout, most likely, is somewhere in-between. 
  
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we build further on previous research showing that indifference and alienation 
decrease turnout. Our aim was to shed light on the question whether indifference and alienation 
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explain turnout in other contexts than the United States. To this end, we have focused on the 
extent to which these concepts are geographically transportable and how indifference should be 
operationalized to give insights on turnout in multiparty contexts.  
The CSES dataset has provided us a cross-national comparative basis to verify if indifference and 
alienation were transportable concepts. Our results show that –as hypothesized– indifference and 
alienation do significantly decrease the probability that a voter casts a ballot. Clearly, the choice 
set matters and even has a profound effect on whether or not one turns out to vote on Election 
Day. A voter who is not sure what party she likes most has a smaller probability of turning out to 
vote. If parties want to fight decreasing turnout, therefore, it is essential that they stress in what 
aspects they differ from the other parties. Having a varied set of options to choose from, will also 
enhance the possibilities of voters to distinguish between them which will in turn increase 
turnout. Alienation, however, has an even stronger impact on turnout. While indifference among 
the electorate certainly is a source of low turnout, a more important problem therefore is the 
electorate’s rejection of all parties. Voters who do not like a single one of the parties are very 
unlikely to cast a ballot. 
We have claimed that for investigating indifference and alienation cross-nationally, we have to 
rely on measures of party evaluations. We furthermore expected that in multiparty systems it is 
essential to take multiple parties into account if one wants to investigate how indifference 
explains turnout. Contrary to our expectations, however, taking into account voters’ attitudes vis-
à-vis all parties in a system is not a better predictor of turnout than an indicator that only takes 
into consideration the most and the least preferred party. Importantly, however, measures of 
indifference that disregard most of the variation in party evaluations by only focusing on the most 
and the second most preferred party are not the option scholars should take. Such a measure is 
not significantly related to the probability that a citizen turns out to vote, which leads us to 
question the validity of this operationalization of indifference. 
Looking at differences between countries, unexpectedly, we find that the strongest effect of 
indifference in turnout takes place in many East-European countries, along with South Korea and 
Japan. Future research should insist on studying these countries in details in order to see which 
political characteristics are shared (or different) and if these factors could become important 
explanations to the causes of indifference and alienation. Additionally, while there is a renewed 
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interested for the effect of indifference and alienation, we know little about who are these 
indifferent and alienated voters. Individual characteristics like education and political interested 
could be at play. Institutional and contextual characteristics could also influence the degree to 
which someone is indifferent such as the ideological parties’ coverage, parties’ behavior and 
strategies (Ceka, 2012) or even issues that are at stake (or not) during a campaign. We can also 
assume that the process behind indifference does not happen overnight. In fact, our knowledge is 
poor on how indifference develops in a timely manner. However, because indifference and 
alienation are strongly correlated to one another, it is possible that indifference could be a prior 
stage of alienation. Panel data would be needed to verify if an increase in indifference through 
time evolves to alienation after a certain period.  
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Appendix 
TABLE 2                                                                                                                                             
Multilevel regression with turnout as dependent variable - Measure of Indifference: 
MaxMin 
       
    Null model Model A Model B Model C 
    Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
  Intercept 2.025*** 2.896 -0.567** -0.061 
   (0.159) (0.162) (0.213) (0.634) 
  Independent variables     
  Indifference (MaxMin)  -1.001*** -0.703*** -0.704*** 
    (0.105) (0.109) (0.108) 
  Alienation  -1.965*** -2.135*** -2.132*** 
    (0.129) (0.134) (0.134) 
  Individual-level controls     
  Age   0.074*** -0.074*** 
     (0.006) (0.005) 
  Age
2 
  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
  Gender   -0.076 -0.076 
     (0.036) (0.036) 
  Education   0.257*** 0.257*** 
     (0.022) (0.022) 
  Religious attendance   0.615*** 0.614*** 
     (0.061) (0.061) 
  Political knowledge   0.333*** 0.333*** 
     (0.019) (0.019) 
  Country-years-level 
controls 
    
  ENEP    -0.069 
      (0.127) 
  Disproportionality    -0.047 
      (0.035) 
  Compulsory voting    0.795 
      (0.647) 
  ICC 0.180 0.179 0.192 0.173 
  Source : CSES - Module 3 
    Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.  *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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TABLE 3                                                                                                                                           
Multilevel regression with turnout as dependent variable - Measure of Indifference: 1st-
2nd 
    Null model Model A Model B Model C 
    Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
  Intercept 2.025*** 2.776*** -0.671** -0.699 
   (0.159) (0.178) (0.226) (0.642) 
  Independent variables     
  Indifference (1st-2nd)  -0.037 -0.559 -0,055 
    (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) 
  Alienation  -2.924*** -2.796*** -2.795*** 
    (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) 
  Individual-level controls     
  Age   0.074*** -0.074*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
  Age
2 
  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
  Gender   -0.079 -0.078 
     (0.036) (0.036) 
  Education   0.262*** 0.262*** 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
  Religious attendance   0.606*** 0.606*** 
     (0.061) (0.062) 
  Political knowledge   0.341*** 0.341*** 
     (0.019) (0.019) 
  Country-years-level controls     
  ENEP    -0.063 
      (0.128) 
  Disproportionality    -0.047 
      (0.035) 
  Compulsory voting    0.773 
      (0.651) 
  ICC 0.180 0.180 0.193 0.175 
  Source : CSES - Module 3 
    Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.  *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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TABLE 4                                                                                                                                       
Multilevel regression with turnout as dependent variable - Measure of 
Indifference: Mean Difference 
    Null model Model 3.A Model 3.B Model 3.C 
    Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
  Intercept 2.025*** 3.020*** -0.518* -0.042 
   (0.159) (0.171) (0.220) (0.642) 
  Independent variables     
  Indifference (MeanDiff)  -0.652*** -0.428** -0.428** 
    (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) 
  Alienation  -2.476*** -2.512*** -2.51*** 
    (0.117) (0.121) (0.120) 
  Individual-level controls     
  Age   0.074*** -0.074*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
  Age
2 
  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
  Gender   -0.077 -0.077 
     (0.037) (0.037) 
  Education   0.262*** 0.262*** 
     (0.022) (0.022) 
  Religious attendance   0.612*** 0.612*** 
     (0.061) (0.061) 
  Political knowledge   0.339*** 0.339*** 
     (0.019) (0.019) 
  Country-years-level 
controls 
    
  ENEP    -0.062 
      (0.128) 
  Disproportionality    -0.047 
      (0.035) 
  Compulsory voting    0.784 
      (0.654) 
  ICC 0.180 0.183 0.194 0.176 
  Source : CSES - Module 3 
    Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.  *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
